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THE ENDURING EXAMPLE OF JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: 
"VIRTUE AS PRACTICE" IN THE SUPREME COURT* 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE** 
I. IN DISSENT .ON THE WARREN COURT 
Twenty years after his last term on the Supreme Court, whatever else 
complimentary may be written of Justice John Marshall Harlan's sixteen 
years on the Court (1955-1971), ~t ought not be said that, in the era of the 
Warren Court, 1 he was a leading champion of civil liberties and of civil 
rights. Rather, of Justice John Marshall Harlan it may more appropriately 
be said that, in the era of the Warren Court, Justice Harlan was more 
often than not in dissent. 2 Indeed, for those inclined to measure judges by 
* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice 
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991). For other writings on Justice Harlan additional to 
those in this conference issue, see THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED 
OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. IIARIAN (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969); 
nNSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARsHALL IIARIAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF TIIE WARREN 
COURT (1992); Stephen M. Dane, "Ordered Libertyn and Self-.Restraint: The Judicial 
Philosophy of the Second Justice Harlan, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 545 (1982); DrewS. Days 
III, Justice John M. Harlan, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 250 (1981); Norman Dorsen, John 
Marshall Harlan, in THE JUSTICES OF TIIE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, 
at 2803 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Ismel eds., 1969); Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public 
Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance 
of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Justice 
Harlan and the First Amendment, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 425 {1985); Henry J. Friendly, 
Mr. Justice Harlan, As Seen by a Friend and Judge of an Inferior Court, 85 HARV. L. 
REv. 382 (1971); Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The First Decade of the Burger Court: 
Conservative Dominance (1969-1979), 21 SANTA CLARAL. REv. 891, 893 (1981); William 
H. Ledbetter, Jr., Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Process and Civil Liberties, 20 S.C. L. REv. 
389 (1968); Gacy C. Leedes, The Revival of Interest in Justice Harlan's Flexible Due 
Process Balancing Approach, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 737 (1982); Lewis I. Maddocks, The 
Two Justice Harlans on Civil Rights and Liberties: A Study in Judicial Contrasts, 68 KY. 
L.J. 301 (1979-80); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Justice Harlan, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 417 
(1986) • 
. ** William R. & Thomas S. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
1. The Court whose Chief Justice is remembered by his foremost biogmpher, Bernard 
Schwartz, as "Super Chief," and whose leading champion, Justice William Brennan, 
arriving a year after Harlan and staying on sixteen years afterwards, is now extolled as the 
"Architect of the Bill of Rights." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF EARL WARREN AND 
HIS SUPREME COURT: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY {1983); Laurence H. Tribe, Architect of the 
Bill of Rights, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 47, 47. 
2. See AlAN BARTII, PROPHETS WI1H HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT 
109 
110 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
the extent of their contribution to "the idea of progress, "3 insofar as the 
Warren Court was the embodiment of that idea, then Justice John Marshall 
Harlan may more suitably be known as the Justice who more often than 
not threw sand into the churning cogwheels of the Warren Court. It was 
Justice Brennan, and not Harlan, who helped oil the moving parts. 
Consider the following brief review of four principal categories of the 
Warren Court civil rights-civil liberties enterprise. 4 
A. Reapportionment Under Supreme Court Directive 
In his own assessment of the era of the Warren Court, the Chief 
Justice personally regarded the reapportionment decisions ("one person, 
one vote") as the most consequential of all those rendered during his 
sixteen years on the Supreme Court (1953-1969). s Yet, in both of the 
seminal cases generating all of the subsequent downstream cases on 
reapportionment, John Marshall Harlan demurred. In each of the two 
"great" cases that launched the Court's reapportionment career, that is, 
pursuant to his inability to fathom the majority's treatment of the 
constitutional clauses that it thought somehow to be relevant and 
controlling, Justice Harlan was in dissent. 6 
B. The Second Reconstruction 
Others believe that those cases falling into a second category were far 
more consequential overall than the reapportionment cases in establishing 
the principal civil rights pedigree of the Warren Court: cases on race and 
racially related voting rights. Justice Harlan was not a member of the 
DISSENTERS IN niE SUPREME COURT 41 (1974) (stating that Harlan, even more so than 
Justice Holmes, genuinely deserved to be called the "Great Dissenter"). 
3. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND niE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
12-13 (1970), in which Bickel suggests that the Warren Court did not remember the past 
and imagine the future, but rather the Court "imagine[d] the past and remember[ed] the 
future." Jd. at 13. In other words, it decided what it wanted to have the Constitution do 
according to its own vision and then made up its own histocy to deem it done. 
4. Willfully omitted from this initial review of cases are others that will be examined 
more particularly later on. 
5. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 410. 
6. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Avccy v. Midland 
County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 
89, 97 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wesbercy v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Court when the opening case, Brown v. Board of Education, 7 was decided 
in 1954. He was a member in 1966, however, when the Warren Court 
held Virginia's poll tax to be unconstitutional as a denial of equal 
protection. 8 But instead of concurring in the majority's holding, Justice 
Harlan disagreed with it; he thought nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment 
reached a nonfederal poll tax per se.9 When, in 1966, the Warren Court 
also upheld a special section of the 1965 Voting Rights Act disallowing 
literacy tests in New York, thus enabling Puerto Ricans to vote though 
unable to speak English, Harlan again demurred. 10 So far as he could 
determine, there was no constitutional basis for the Act. Also in 1966, 
when the Warren Court reconstrued, applied, and sustained as 
constitutional a Reconstruction act to reach racially motivated private 
conspiracies against persons in travel, Harlan was unable to agree with the 
majority. 11 And in 1964, he again disassociated himself from the Warren 
Court; insofar as the majority suggested that ordinary enforcement of state 
trespass statutes at the instance of private entrepreneurs might violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment per se, Harlan was respectfully in dissent. 12 
In 1968, moreover, he found no warrant for the Warren Court view 
that a century-old act of Congress did-or constitutionally could-reach 
all private racial refusals to enter into property transfers. 13 So, there 
again, he was unable to help oil the progressive machine. Nor did he 
agree that a statewide referendum repeal of a state fair housing act, 
coupled with a state constitutional prohibition on the enactment of 
legislation affecting private decisions to sell or not sell, was forbidden by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as the majority of the Warren Court 
believed.14 Nor, in 1961, was it obvious to Justice Harlan how anything 
adverted to in another Warren Court majority opinion satisfied Fourteenth 
Amendment state action requirements in respect to a private, commercial 
7. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
8. See H!Uper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 6~3 (1966). 
9. See id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
10. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see 
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress lacked the power to invalidate age-based voting 
eligibility requirements); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (ratified in 1971) ("The right of 
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years or older, to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or any State on account of age."). 
11. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
12. See Bell v. Mruyland, 378 U.S. 226, 311 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
13. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). • 
14. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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restaurant lessee's refusal of service in Wilmington, Delaware. 15 Given 
the state of the record, as he understood it, the most that Justice Harlan 
believed to be warranted in this case was to remand the matter for further 
consideration. 16 
C. The Criminal Procedure Revolution 
If a laggard on reapportionment by constitutional fiat (as he was), and 
if not particularly activist on a number of race-related civil rights decisions 
during this era (as evidently he wasn't), where else might Justice Harlan 
have made a great substantive civil rights-civil liberties mark during these 
heady years? A third category of civil rights-civil liberties advance during 
the Warren Court years was assuredly that of criminal procedure and the 
great expansion of rights of the criminally accused. The cases of the time 
were sufficiently famous that several became eponymous in their own 
right. Among the most famous were: Gideon v. Wainwright, 17 Mapp 
v.Ohio/8 Griffin v. Illinois/9 Fay v. Noia,2D and Miranda v. 
15. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S 715, 728 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
16. Id. at 728 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In a classic remarlc that exhibited the whole 
distance between his own approach to constitutional adjudication and that of others for 
whom such matters were mere details at best, Harlan began his expression of reproach in 
Burton in this way: 
The Court's opinion, by a process of first undiscriminatingly throwing together 
various factual bits and pieces and then undermining the resulting structure by 
an equally vague disclaimer ••• leave[s] completely at sea just what it is in this 
record that satisfieS' the requirement of "state action" [without which the 
majority's result cannot constitutionally be obtained]. 
!d.; see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 322 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the opinion of the majority "substitutes for the comparatively clear and concrete tests 
of state action a catch-phrase approach as vague and amorphous as it is far-reaching"). 
Justice Harlan is sometimes extolled for his important opinion for the Court in 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (confirming and protecting a 
First Amendment right of political association). One may well agree, as I do, that this is 
a seminal case and an enduring opinion. Even so, one should also note that in the balance 
of the Warren Court's cases on this very subject, overall, Justice Harlan was more often 
than not in dissent. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting); Hemy v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 457 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investig. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 576 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 496 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
17. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
18. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
19. 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
20. 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
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Arizona. 21 Even now, a leading casebook identifies Miranda as "probably 
the most famous and controversial Warren Court criminal procedure 
case. "22 And indeed, who has not heard of "Mirandizing" an arrestee? 
So, perhaps it will be fruitful to take an additional look here. 
But Justice Harlan dissented in Miranda, 23 as he dissented also in 
Mapp v. Ohio,24 as well as in Fay v. Noia. 25 And he also dissented in 
Griffin v. lllinois.26 Even in Gideon, in which Harlan concurred, the 
ease of the Warren Court's passage-a quick passage so characteristic of 
the Warren Court's overall work-was not acceptable to Justice Harlan.27 
For Harlan, the correct doing of constitutional law required a certain 
turning of squarer corners. 28 In terms of particular outcomes, in any 
event, judged by these cases, his position cannot qualify him as a major 
contributing figure to the expansion of criminal procedure rights in the 
grand era of the Warren Court. 
D. A Downside Sampler of Freedom of Speech, 
Press, and Religion 
Having briefly canvassed three other famous categories of Warren 
Court reforms, we shall turn to the last readily identifiable category of 
fundamental liberty in progressive ferment during the Warren Court 
era-the great liberties of the First Amendment, especially freedom of 
speech and of the press. Consider Barenblatt v. United States, 29 Wood 
21. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
22. WilliAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSlTIUTIONALLAW: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS 307 (6th ed. 1986). 
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
24. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan accepted the exclusionary 
rule as constitutionally grounded in Fourth Amendment cases, but distinguished state 
procedures as governed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause instead. 
25. Fay, 372 U.S. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
26. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 29 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Douglas v. California, 
372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (also involving indigents on appeal). 
27. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349 (Harlan, J., conc~ning). 
28. See, for example, the discussion of the Burton case, supra note 16. In Gideon, 
Justice Harlan began his concurrence in the following way: "I agree that Bens v. Brady 
should be overruled, but consider it entitled to a more respectful burial than has been 
accorded •••• " Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349. See also Harlan's careful address in due 
process terms in the indigent access to divorce case, rejecting the larger equal protection 
mtionale, in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971), and his careful concurrence 
in the wiretap case overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928}, in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concuning). 
29. 360 u.s. 109 (1959). 
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v. Georgia,'!Al Tzme, Inc. v. Hill,31 United States v. Robe/,32 Tznker v. 
Des Moines School District, 33 and New York Tzmes Co. v. United 
States,34-in not one of these cases was Justice Harlan obviously "on the 
side of" free speech. . 
In the first major Supreme Court First Amendment case of this series, 
Barenb/att v. United States,35 in 1958, he joined the majority to be sure; 
but in that case, the free speech claim actually lost. In each of these other 
major Warren Court free speech cases, the majority held in favor of the 
First Amendment claim, but Justice Harlan did not. So, as to these, his 
views were less "on the side" of free speech than those of the majority. 
In the last of these cases, the famous Pentagon Papers case, in 1971, Earl 
Warren was no longer Chief Justice so it was no longer literally the era 
of the Warren Court. But even as of that late year, beyond the fringe of 
the Warren Court (and its idea of progress), Justice Harlan was in dissent 
against the First Amendment claim that had prevailed. 36 
And so, too, things appear to have gone with respect to the 
neighboring First Amendment clause on the free exercise of religion. In 
the critical case decided by the Court in 1963 that fundamentally rewrote 
Free Exercise Clause doctrine,37 whereas Justice Brennan wrote for a 
Warren Court ~ajority in holding that the First Amendment required 
unemployment compensation to be paid from tax-collected funds for 
persons refusing work that conflicted with their day of religious 
observance, Harlan filed an emphatic dissent. 38 In his view, it was quite 
impossible to see how the Free Exercise Clause compelled such a subsidy, 
despite what the majority said. 39 So, here again, one may say that he was 
30. 370 u.s. 375 (1962). 
31. 385 u.s. 374 (1967). 
32. 389 u.s. 258 (1967). 
33. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
34. 403 u.s. 713 (1971). 
35. 360 u.s. at 109. 
36. To be sure, Justice Harlan did not hold that the government was as yet entitled to 
an injunction to suppress publication of the purloined Pentagon Papers. Rather, his position 
was, as the court of appeals had held, that the district court had been provided an 
insufficient opportunity to enable the government to make the extmordimuy showing that 
Harlan agreed the First Amendment required it to make, in order to succeed as it possibly 
might. See New York 1imes, 403 U.S. at 755-56. 
37. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
38. See id. at 418 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
39. Se~ id. at 423. In a significant number of additional First Amendment religion-
specific accommodation cases, as in Sherbert, Justice Harlan was more rigorous in facing 
the difficulties of reconciling the results with Establishment Clause doctrine than was the 
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far less generous than others on the Court at the time in his construction 
of the relevant constitutional clause. 
Of course this brief review of thirty or so of the most notable 
decisions from the era of the Warren Court underreports the whole work_ 
of that Court during Justice Harlan's tenure. Even so, it is surely 
sufficient to help remind one concretely of specific positions Justice 
Harlan held at the time. More than was true of any other Justice of the 
same period, in virtually all four categories of the Warren Court's 
expansionary constitutional and statutory decisions, despite what has been 
left out here, it remains correct that his was the single most frequent voice 
in dissent. So what shall one say about that? 
IT. "VIRTUE AS PRACTICE" 
In his far ranging essay After Virtue,40 Alasdair Macintyre 
investigates a view of virtue as "the notion of goods internal to a 
practice. "41 It is a view one might also identify as easily, and perhaps 
better, as the idea of virtue as the quality of professional commitment in 
a particular sense. The "goods" internal to a practice, as Macintyre 
helpfully recalls in his provocative essay, are not worldly goods, at least 
not in the usual sense, but something else. In the course of explaining the 
idea, Macintyre offers the following explanation and comparison: 
Consider the example of a highly intelligent seven-year-old child 
whom I wish to teach to play chess, although the child has no 
particular desire to learn the game. The child does however have 
a very strong desire for candy and little chance of obtaining it. I 
therefore tell the child that if the child will play chess with me 
once a week I will give the ,child 50¢ worth of candy; moreover 
I tell the child that I will always play in such a way that it will be 
difficult, but not impossible, for the child to win and that, if the 
child wins, the child will receive an extra 50¢ worth of candy. 
Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win. Notice however 
prevailing Supreme Court majority at the time. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm. of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664, 696-97 (1970) (Opinion of Harlan, J.). Harlan's view in this case 
was that property tax exemption of religiously held property is consistent With the 
Establishment Clause only on the assumption that other kinds of nonprofit ideological 
groups are treated the same way. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357-58 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), where Harlan stated that exemption from militacy training 
and combatant service provided by Congress for religious conscientious objectors is valid 
only if all other conscientious objectors are treated as similarly exempt. _ 
40. AL\SDAIR C. MACINTIRE, AFrER VIRTIJE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981). 
41. Id. at 175. 
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that, so long as it is the candy alone which provides the child 
with a good reason for playing chess, the child has no reason not 
to cheat and every reason to cheat, provided he or she can do so 
successfully. But, so we may hope, there will come a time when 
the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the 
achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, 
strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of 
reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular 
occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of 
chess demands. Now if the child cheats, he or she will be 
defeating not me, but himself or herself.42 
"But, so we may hope, there will come a time when the child will find in 
those goods specific to chess, ... a new set of reasons"43 sufficient in 
themselves to abstain from "cheating," even when (and one wants to 
emphasize this particularly) he or she can do so successfully,44 or even 
when doing so successfu!7 generates external goods lying outside the 
immediate practice itself. Importantly, Macintyre adds an observation 
to this suggestion of virtue as a certain kind of practice. He declares that 
"[t]hose who lack the relevant experience are incompetent thereby as 
judges of internal goods. "46 One must have an experience in working 
within, I suppose he means, to know virtue as practice. Justice John 
Marshall Harlan assuredly did reflect that experience, and it is by the 
character of his practice that so many-by no means persons of the same 
view on the outcome of particular cases in which he wrote-came to 
believe strongly in the integrity of his work. 
This imagery of "virtue as practice" is not captured in case outcomes, 
as in merely asking who won. Nor, for that matter, is it caught in 
supposing that virtue in practice is captured in one's resolve as a judge to 
fulfill the familiar maxim, justitia fiat, coelum ruat. To "let justice be 
done though the heavens fall" (which is how this familiar maxim roughly 
translates), is not virtue as practice, but rather simply a commitment to do 
what the maxim declares-to do whatever it is that one thinks to be 
42. Id. at 175-76. 
43. Id. 
44. For example, even when no one will know (indeed, so far as outsiders can sec, 
all the proper rules of chess are at all times being strictly met). 
45. Whether the "external goods" be those secured to the chess player as a chess 
player (as to be world renown) or to the chess player in some other way (as a great 
champion of others, for example, as to have n1I the "candy" that comes consequential to 
winning put into a trust account for the benefit of others and not for himself or 
~erself-that is, impersonal extemnl goods). · 
46. MACINTYRE, supra note 40, at 176. 
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"justice." It is, moreover, a thoroughly apocalyptic vision of a judge's 
role, a vision John Marshall Harlan eschewed. It implicitly maintains that 
justice (or rather that which one deems to be justice) always comes first, 
thus everything else comes second-including such lesser matters as truth. 
This, however, plainly was not Justice Harlan's view in his practice of 
constitutional law during his sixteen years on the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 47 The truth, rather, mattered much to Harlan, or so at 
least I believe it did, as do others who have likewise studied his work. 48 
The truth was for John Marshall Harlan not a subordinate clause to 
the judge's oath; it was not a merely quondam thing to be given its due 
only if congenial to "justice," but not otherwise. Neither was the truth to 
be captured in merely ingenious or merely plausible-but fictive-readings 
of constitutional clauses or articles. 49 The truth, indeed, has nothing to do 
47. For an elaboration on this paragraph, see William Van Alstyne, Notes on a 
Bicentennial Constitution, Part II: Antinomial Choices and the Role of the Supreme Court, 
72 IOWA L. REv. 1281 (1987). 
48. See, e.g., sources cited supra note*· 
49. In this conference, Professor Ackerman contrasts what he calls "independent 
constitutionalism" with what he calls "common law constitutionalism." Bruce Ackerman, 
The Common Law Constitution of John MarshaU Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 5 
(1991). He attributes the latter as more of a piece with Harlan, but faults Harlan on that 
account, commending "independent constitutionalism" as the better vision-less staid, more 
dynamic, more liberal, and more liberating as surely it is. In defense of "independent 
constitutionalism," moreover, Professor Ackerman observes how it can serve both to (a) 
expand processes of democratic majoritarianism, and (b) expand entrenched rights against 
majorities, at one and the same time. See id. at 11-25. As always, when Professor 
Ackerman writes on this theme as he has so impressively, he does an excellent job in 
making his point. Choosing examples from the Warren Court, he shows how "independent 
constitutionalism" was pro-democratic in several respects, such as in the invalidation of the 
Virginia poll tax, and he is likewise able to draw on a number of other Warren Court 
decisions expanding the field of entrenched rights. See id. at 11-20. So, all is well ... 
except perhaps for a niggling matter or two. 
An alternative (to Ackerman) in the manner of either expanding democratic processes 
beyond those already provided for by the Constitution, or expanding the list of rights and/or 
liberties beyond those provided for by the Constitution, is found in the Constitution itself. 
Come to think of it, this alternative (rather than "independent constitutionalism") is all that 
the Constitution provides and has had a fair bit of use. For example, the proposal and 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, and so, too, the proposal and ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, and so, too, the Twenty-third, the Twenty-fourth, and the Twenty-
sixth Amendments as well-each and all expanded the participating body politic. And each 
is quite express and quite concrete. Come to think of it, this is also how several important 
entrenched personal rights became established: by amending the Constitution. Come to look 
at it close up in contrast, Professor Ackerman's agenda of "independent constitutionalism" 
is but a felicitous restatement of a most familiar Ackerman theme: the encouragement of 
judicial flexibility in lieu of amendments (of participation anp of protection) by decisional 
fiat-without proposal or ratification pursuant to Article V. 
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with facile things. It likewise has less affinity for those who, remembering 
the future, can at once so easily therefore also "imagine" the past. 50 For 
the quality of the example Harlan provided of virtue as practice in this 
regard, I do not know of a judge_ whom it is more of a privilege to pay an 
admiring tribute to than to John Marshall Harlan. 
But however one might try, having said just this much, one cannot in 
a short paper-probably not even in an endless paper-convince anyone 
that Justice Harlan actually warrants this special praise. And I certainly do 
not mean to suggest. that the fact that Harlan was in dissent in a large 
number of leading decisions of the Warren Court somehow per se 
establishes his virtue-as though by innuendo against the Warren Court 
one thereby means to praise Harlan. I mean no such thing at all. 
Moreover; laying aside any claim of that sort, I have no means finally to 
persuade anyone of Harlan's good example of virtue as practice. Rather, 
if it comes, it comes simply as a conclusion one will reach; if at all, I 
suppose, ultimately only by way of one's own abiding impression of 
Justice Harlan, after doing the best one can in devoting quite a long time 
in trying to take the measure of the same things he and others worked on, 
and in coming to that task without illusion or predisposition, so far as one 
can manage to do. Here, I can but suggest a few particular examples that 
seem to me most helpful in taking the measure of John Marshall Harlan 
during his years on the Supreme Court, as a judge who represented virtue 
as practice. So, all too briefly, let us give it a try. We do so in a brief 
review of but four cases in which Justice Harlan wrote several of his most 
interesting opinions, each selected for review in order to make a particular 
point, to be fitted within an overall assessment at the end. Sl 
To call this judicial technique "independent constitutionalism," however, is at least 
appropriate, albeit perhaps more so than Professor Ackerman intends. It envisions a 
Supreme Court busily making constitutional changes quite "independent" of the Constitution 
and quite as it thinks best. It will operate (as it sometimes already has opemted) much in 
the manner of Hans Christian Andersen and The Emperor's New Clothes. Within the new 
pamble "the Constitution" is the Emperor. The Court then tells us from time to time, just 
how perfect the Emperor looks (he merely looks a bit naked, as it were, to us). But I surely 
agree that Justice Harlan can be faulted (if fault it be) for not giving himself as readily as 
others to this often personally self-gratifying and sometimes even highly rewarding, and 
thoroughly constructive community fmud. Perhaps, moreover, even as Professor Ackerman 
implies, some who served with Harlan thought this entirely appropriate, and accordingly 
declared "Behold!" Justice Harlan did not usually exclaim "Behold." Rather, in his quiet, 
professional manner, he was more likely to say: ":j3ehold what?" 
50. See supra note 3. 
51. The examples are taken from cases involving particular parts of the Bill of Rights, 
rather than other areas of constitutional review, simply in keeping with the focus of this 
panel on that portion of Harlan's work. 
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ill. VIRTUE APPLIED 
A. Cohen v. California 
Decided in 1971, the Cohen52 case belies the expectation one might 
otherwise have were one's impression based only on the frequency of 
Harlan's dissents in the general run of decisions of the Warren Court, that 
he must have taken a narrow measure of constitutional review. To the 
contrary, as illustrated by Cohen, Justice Harlan's understanding of 
principles of generous construction of constitutional c1auses was fully 
equal to Justice Marshall's own approach in matters of constitutional 
adjudication53-in this instance, an understanding applied to the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In Cohen, moreover, Harlan's 
opinion drew insights from the very fact of Cohen's rude language, 54 
rather than distancing himself from it as the dissent chose to do. ss 
Cohen's "immature antic"56 (as the dissent described it) actually went to 
the most divisive political issue of the time, namely, the war in Vietnam 
and the military draft that sustained it. In the critical passages of his 
opinion for the Court, understanding the setting exactly, Justice Harlan 
picked up the point and wrote: 
[I]mportant to our conclusion[57] is the constitutional backdrop 
against which our decision must be made. The constitutional 
52. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
53. Specifically, clauses in the Constitution carry a presumption of general utility and 
of more permanent principle than do statutes or rules of common law. The latter provide 
mutable, provisional "answers" to some perceived problem addressed by legislative 
resolution which may or may not prove serviceable but in any event are alterable by the 
same politics that generated them. They may, but need not, convey any large principle or 
philosophy. Constitutional provisions, however, presumptively address matters at a more 
enduring level of principle and concern, and should be treated accordingly-with that 
perspective in full view. See -Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 
627-50 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819). 
54. The rude language was this: Fuck the draft. It was lettered onto the jacket Paul 
Cohen wore when arrested in the corridor of the Los Angeles courthouse for breach of the 
peace. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. 
55. Justices Blackmun and Black, and Chief Justice Burger, dissented in Cohen. They 
did so in a cursocy dissent by Blackmun characterizing Cohen's expression as an "absurd 
and immature antic .•• mainly conduct and little speech," in their view a vulgarity easily 
outweighed by considerations of public decorum and public peace. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. 
57. The "conclusion" was that the conviction for breach of the peace, as affmned in 
the state court of appeals, must be reversed. Id. at 24. 
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right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as 
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to 
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion . . . . 
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may 
often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive 
utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth 
necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the 
process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at 
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a 
sign of weakness but of strength. . . . 
. . . [W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as 
their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the 
Constitution while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual 
speech has little or no regard for that emotive function which 
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of 
the overall message to be communicated. . . . 
. . . [W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can 
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of 
suppressing ideas in the process. 58 • 
I do not think Cohen needs a great deal of comment, even two decades 
removed from its inscription. The appreciation of First Amendment core 
principles is represented as straightforwardly in Harlan's opinion in Cohen 
as in the best opinions decades earlier by Holmes and Brandeis. And 
Harlan was surely insightful in seeing "not a sign of weakness but of 
strength"59 in the verbal cacophony of which he wrote. Harlan's modest 
reminder of the "emotive" force of protected speech, too, is much more 
than an afterthought. Just two summers ago, eighteen years after Cohen, 
the point was brought back when flag-burning Gregory Johnson prevailed 
in the Supreme Court partly on the strength of what Harlan wrote in 
Cohen. 60 In Tiananmen Square, in this same summer two years ago, in 
contrast with Cohen, there was assuredly no quarter given for immature 
antics or emotive expressions of political dissent. Far from it. There was 
instead the ultimate "decorum" of death. By any fair measure, Cohen was 
not simply a small matter about a vulgar antic as Justice Blackmun 
suggested in dissent. It was, rather, a case about political freedom, as 
Harlan understood. 
58. Id. at 24-26. 
59. Id. at 25. 
60. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also United States v. 
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (a reprise of the Johnson case). 
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B. Poe v. Ullman and Griswold v. Connecticut 
The related prior point meant to be illustrated here is that Harlan's 
Poe61 and Griswokf'Z opinions (a) provide a further report of a principle 
of generous construction, but (b) at the same time also display an 
understanding that all constitutions, including our own, are necessarily 
ethnocentric, much as Holmes had understood as well. 63 And Haria~ 
carefully indicates an intention to abide by that remembrance in the useful 
61. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
62. 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
63. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
I think the word "liberty," in the Fourteenth Amendment, is perverted when it 
is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be 
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed 
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
traditions of our people and our law. 
Id. (emphasis added). The "unless" clause in Holmes's opinion furnishes the occasion for 
the judicial checking function according to the Constitution. The reference is not a universal 
one, moreover, but midrange and culturally specific (thus the "ethnocentric" boundaty 
reference in administering substantive due process review). "Marriage," as a special estate 
of privacy, may well meet this test against certain intrusions, but even then the term itself 
carries a boundaty as it were-i.e., "marriage" as traditionally understood. For Holmes, 
no doubt polygamous marriage, even assuming it had or now has a rock solid foundation 
in some other culture, as it may well have, would not be understood as such in this one. 
Accordingly, the idea of raising an "equal protection" entitlement for plural, as for 
monogamous, "marriage" would not work; not because eminently reasonable persons 
cannot be found to fmd solace and nurture equally in polygamous relationships as in 
monogamous relationships, but because it cannot be found equally entrenched in protection 
ascribable to any existing real clause, whether of substantive due process or otherwise, in 
the Constitution as is. 
Poe: 
Compare with this discussion, Justice Harlan's similarly constrained observations in 
The right of privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not 
suggest that adultexy, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from 
criminal enquixy, however privately practiced. . . . 
Adultexy, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State 
forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an 
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which 
the State not only must allow, but which always and in evexy age it has fostered 
and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid 
extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marxy, but it is quite 
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in 
it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that 
intimacy. 
Poe, 367 U.S. at 552-53. 
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opinions he wrote. 64 The authenticity of adjudication in respect to cases 
such as Poe and Griswold was thus expressly checked-by Harlan-in 
taking due care in crafting his opinions neither to neglect the informing 
strength of the institution and tradition he drew upon ("marriage") nor to 
exaggerate it, thus leaving the law freer beyond the identifiable zone. So, 
it seems to me that Harlan was persuasive in his opinion but persuasive 
partly because he was also careful, however, not to embrace anything 
beyond that which he could show strong support for by a rigorous test. If 
that is so, as I think it is, then Harlan would most likely have voted with 
the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick, 65 and it seems to me a virtual 
certainty that he would have been amazed at, and would have rejected, 
Justice Brennan's "equal protection" argument in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 66 
64. See the excerpt from Harlan's opinion supra note 63. By much the same test, 
moreover, "marriage" itself is understood in a particular way within this opinion: 
monogamous (not polygamous), and heterosexual (not homosexual). Expectations that 
Harlan would fmd satisfactory substantive due process or equal protection levemge to 
judicially remake the constitutionally protected army of "personal intimacy" choices of the 
less culture-bounded mnge that authors such as David Richards or Kenneth Karst would 
encoumge of the Court, would surely be altogether misplaced. See generally Kenneth L. 
Karst, 7he Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (advocating a 
presumptive freedom of intimate association encompassing all close and familiar personal 
relationships comparable, in some significant way, to a marriage or family relationship); 
David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 800 (1986) (criticizing the Court's failure to extend the constitutional right of privacy 
to consensual homosexual relationships). 
65. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
66. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court held a criminal prohibition on the 
distribution of contraceptives to an unmarried person to be a denial of equal protection of 
such a person vis-a-vis a married person. Justice Brennan's odd efforts here begin in the 
following way: "If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons 
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribut~on to unmarried persons would be equally 
imp~nnissible." Id. at 453. Really? Nothing in Harlan's opinion in Poe or in Griswold 
provides any foundations for such a claim as Justice Brennan asserted here. Indeed, the 
opposite would be true. If it is the case that the state may not forbid persons from having 
sexu!ll intercourse even within marriage, does it follow that it would be "equally 
impermissible" to disallow fornication-sexual intercourse without marriage? If so, why 
is that? But unless it would be equally impermissible, why, then, would a ban on 
contraceptive access for an unmarried person stand or fall according to the constitutionality 
of such a restriction as applied in respect to married persons, acting within marriage? If the 
restriction on distributing contraceptive devices is a restriction against distribution to those 
whose most standard use of such devices would be to commit a crime (fornication), the 
restriction would prima facie seem to pass every reasonable test of constitutional scrutiny, 
whatever the rights of married persons acting within marriage may be. Perhaps such a 
statute might still fail on some other account, but one is not likely to fmd anything in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird to discover why that is so. The Court's opinion is, in any case, utterly 
"unHarlanlike," but then Justice Harlan was no longer on the Court. It is just another 
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Assuming it to be so, moreover, there is no reason to believe that Justice 
Harlan would have acted from any animus for the value of such rights as 
were sought to be claimed in either Bowers or Eisenstadt. Rather, he 
would have acted simply from his informed inability to reinvent the 
clauses relied upon by Brennan in each of these cases. 
C. Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California 
These two cases were treated as of a single piece by the Supreme 
Court, but they were distinct for Harlan. In Roth, involving an act of 
Congress, the First Amendment was directly and fully at stake. 67 In 
Alberts, a state statute was all that was involved, to be assessed under the 
Fourteenth Amyndment. 68 Harlan emphasized the lesser consequences of 
state laws on freezing the national status quo of attitudes toward acceptable 
obscenity and on flexibility, change, and variation·, than when acts of 
Congress presume to lay down the heavy regime of a single flat, national, 
criminal law-a law pre-empting what may well be the more permissive 
attitude in some locales and pre-empting, too, for all practical purposes, 
whatever additional protections state supreme court Justices might find (as 
currently in Oregon) in state constitutional free speech provisions. In Roth, 
moreover, Harlan rightly noted that the federal interest was marginal to 
begin with; he properly pointed out that "Congress has no substantive 
power over sexual morality. "69 The thematic point meant to be added 
here is to note the continuing awareness of federalism interests 
characteristic of Harlan's more subtle approach-less procrustean dogma, 
more care, more nuance, more attention to differences in text, in specific 
history, and in effect. Again, the point is not meant to be ponderous, but 
in his taking care not to hold (rather cavalierly, as Brennan did?) that 
"obscenity" is somehow just a category excluded from all conventional 
free speech protection, there is in Harlan a seriousness of thought and an 
awareness that notices relationships among parts of the Constitution as 
well. 
D. Sherbert v. Verner 
Rejecting the free exercise claim, and thus dissenting in this case, 
Harlan came directly to terms with a related clause the majority did not 
reason he is much missed. 
67. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957) (consolidation of Roth and 
Alberts, sustaining an anti-obscenity act of Congress and an anti-obscenity act of the 
California legislature, respectively). 
68. See id. at 479-80. 
69. Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., concuning in part and dissenting in part). 
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appear to address or even to take care to consider in the course of its 
decision favoring the original plaintiff in this case.70 Justice Harlan 
confronted the implicit Establishment Clause tension that the majority, in 
its haste to favor the "deserving" unemployment compensation claimant, 
rather blithely brushed over. I have discussed the case in a footnote above, 
in relation to two other Establishment Clause-Free Exercise Clause cases 
in which Harlan's position also set him apart.71 In each of these, as in 
each case we have already examined, he is more attentive to distinctions, 
more aware of other principles, other clauses, other cases which, for him, 
always needed to be accounted for and given their due. The problem for 
Harlan in Sherbert itself can be quickly stated, although I do so here in a 
rather simplified way. 
Sherbert was not a case in which a harsh conflict existed between a 
state law and claims of religious conscience-i.e., a case involving a 
statute either requiring a religious person to do something or to forbear 
from something contrary to the dictates of their faith. Rather, Sherbert 
was a case where insofar as a person might quit a job from the need to 
stay home with a young child or even to attend a dying relative, the 
unemployment compensation statute of the state provided no benefits, nor 
did it so provide for persons quitting a job for religious reasons. In 
Sherbert Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, nonetheless produced 
a result requiring just such payments from the state fund. 72 By focusing on 
the hardship to Ms. Sherbert in the nonavailability of unemployment 
compensation to her upon leaving work when her employer shifted to a 
six-day schedule, one day of which (Saturday) her religion told her to 
keep holy, the Court described the arrangement as "penalizing" the free 
exercise of religion itself. 73 For Justice Harlan, however, this way of 
dealing with the case (and its startling neglect to reconcile the Court's own 
Establishment Clause cases) would not do. We capture here but a portion 
of his able dissent, but it is useful even so: 
70. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
71. See supra note 39. 
72. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410; see also Frazee v. Illinois Dcp't of Employment 
Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (extending Sherbert to encompass a claimant who is not a 
member of an established religious sect, but still holds religious beliefs that prohibit him 
from working on Sunday); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, .480 U.S. 136 
(1987) (invalidating a state statute that denied benefits to a claimant who was discharged 
for refusal to worlc on her Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 
450 U.S. 707 (1981) (applying and extending Sherbert to a statute that disqualified a 
claimant who quit his job for religious reasons). 
73. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
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Today's decision is disturbing both in its rejection of existing 
precedent and in its implications for the future. . . . 
The South Carolina Supreme Court has uniformly applied [its] 
law in conformity with its clearly expressed purpose. It has 
consistently held that one is not "available for work" if his 
unemployment has resulted not from the inability of industry to 
provide a job but rather from personal circumstances, no matter 
how compelling .... r4J 
In the present case all that the state court has done is to apply 
these accepted principles. . . . 
. . . What the Court is holding is that if the State chooses to 
condition unemployment compensation on the applicant's 
availability for work, it is constitutionally compelled to carve out 
an exception-and to provide benefits-for those whose 
unavailability is due to their religious convictions. Such a holding 
has particular significance in two respects. 15 
125 
One of those "two respects," of course, is how to make sense of this 
version of the Free Exercise Clause insofar as it does more than exempt 
a person from conforming to a law valid as applied to others (the usual 
manner in which free exercise claims may be entitled to some recognition 
arise, but not at all a question presented by Sherben), but appears also to 
mandate payment of financial assistance specially targeted to persons 
identified by religiously motivated action. Our purpose is satisfactorily 
served here merely to have noted the question Justice Harlan raised, a 
question raising serious Establishment Clause issues frankly not met in the 
majority opinion at all.76 And so, just how does one count Justice Harlan 
in this case? As a dissent "against" a claim of civil liberty? As a judge, 
rather, voting "for" the Constitution? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Harlan was a judge who tried remarkably successfully always 
to answer for the full integrity of his work on the Supreme Court. His 
seriousness of purpose, his conscientiousness, his understanding, his 
openness, his courtesy, his skill, his learning, all seem so apparent as one 
turns pages, reads, and reflects. Whether one finds in any of this "virtue 
74. For example, the case of a claimant leaving a job to attend a sick or dying relative 
and unable to return to work, or a claimant who must care for young children and who, on 
that account, leaves a job and is similarly not available to resume work or take another job. 
75. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 418-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
76. See Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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as practice," as Macintyre meant to describe it, perhaps one cannot finally 
say. But I believe there was virtue of a rare sort in Justice Harlan. It was 
well reflected in his years on the Supreme Court. This law school honors 
itself in honoring John Marshall Hat.:lan. He is very greatly missed. 
